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I Introduction
Trade credits are important financial mechanism for the firms, particularly for those with poor
institutional environment. In developed economies, trade credits are usually facilitated both by a
formal contract that invokes contract law, and by informal inter-firm relationships. When laws or
institutions related to contracts are not reliable, as we observe in most of developing and transitional
economies, how much and in what way do firms rely on trade credits? If the enforcement institutions
are completely vacuous, relational contracting based purely on power of related parties can be a
possibility. However, in reality, we rarely observe a pure vacuum of enforcement mechanism, and
there is a varying degree of enforceability, be it formal or informal, across and within countries.
Viewing in this way, transition from planning to market can be regarded as a natural experiment
that varies the enforceability of contracts. Under the ‘big bang’ type transition, such as in former
USSR, we can consider the transition as a negative onetime shock on enforceability. It is, however,
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difficult to identify the effects of loss in enforceability with cross-sectional data of big bang type
transition economies, because, firstly, the size of shocks can be different between countries, and
secondly, the choice of big bang type transition may be correlated with the country-specific factors
that may also affect the use of trade credits, resulting in a selection problem.
Under the ‘gradual’ type transition, as in China and in Viet Nam, it is likely that the state sector,
which has remained economically active throughout the transition, to have greater enforceability
of contracts. If this is true, one can consistently estimate the effects of enforceability on the use
of trade credits by observing inter-firm differences, provided that enforcebility is historically and
exogenously determined (largely independent from the context of trade credit decisions). This seems
to be a reasonable assumption for China. One can safely assume that a greater need for trade credits
by the state sector has not been causing the closer relationship between the state sector and the
government, relative to that of other sectors, thus there is no endogeneity problem. The state sector,
naturally and institutionally, is known to have been keeping a close relationship with the government.
And the government has kept law, order, and enforcement on behalf of judiciary who is not endowed
with a sufficient enforcement power. It is true that the government’s enforcement is often argued
as being imperfect and biased, nevertheless, it might have strengthened the enforceability of trade
credit contracts of state sector.
A possibility that the state sector has played some role in securing the trade credit contracts is by no
means negligible when we try to understand the puzzling macroeconomic performance of Chinese
economy. It is well known that it has some major problems: namely, inefficiency of state sector,
corruption of government officials, and mounting arrears of trade credits. The Chinese economy,
nonetheless, has outperformed consistently our expectation that they will soon hold back its high
growth. One of the answers to the puzzle, which we elaborate in this paper, is the efficiency gain
from using trade credits by the state sector. The Figure 1 shows the comovement of GDP and liquid
assets, both in levels and in growh rates, between 1988 and 2004. As evident in the figures, we
have a positive correlation between the two, except for 1992 when we saw an explosion of liquid
F 1: C  GDP  T L A  L
(L)   G R (R)
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assets. This is also confirmed by OLS of GDP on liquid assets and prices, both in levels and in
first-differences (not shown).*1 Although one cannot infer any causality by looking at the positive
correlation of the two, it is at least suggestive that the use of trade credits, which increases liquid
assets, may have contributed to higher growth of economy through efficiency gains in commercial
transactions.
Data we use in this paper, collected in 2003 IDE-DRC survey, include 113 effective respondents;
the average employment, sales, and net profits were 290.8, 17.682 million RMB and 0.595 mil-
lion RMB respectively. All surveyed firms is classified into small and medium sized enterprises,
and made enough profits. Here, we asked several questions about the role of the government in
‘enforcement technology’ (see T 1 and T 2).
Then, who is responsible for contract enforcement? Respondents were asked whether or not they
agreed that the government (both local and national) would resolve inter-firm conflicts. 45 percent
(50/110) of the total agreed. As shown in T 1, state owned and collective owned firms, who have
supervisory departments in the government, answered yes with higher shares (60 and 100 percent)
than average.
However, it is often complained that enforcement by the government has a bias in that the gov-
ernment tends to protect its own local companies against outsiders. T 2 shows answers to the
T 1: E F  C S P?
T 2: G R I-F D?
*1The augmented Dickey-Fuller test of nonstationarity cannot be rejected for all three variables, and cointegration of three
variables is also not rejected. So the positive correlation we see can be considered as a long-run equilibrium phenomenon.
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questions regarding whether or not the local courts give preference to local companies with regard
to ‘execution of judgment.’ When suits were filed in the unpaid customer’s hometown, no accused
customer executed judgment by themselves; the courts only execute half of the cases (4 out of 9),
and 5 out of 9 cases remained unexecuted. When suits were filed in the accuser’s hometown, the
accused voluntarily executed judgment in 6 cases, and the courts forced execution in 15 out of 22.
Only 1 case remained unexecuted. There seems to be a clear bias in enforcement of contracts and
execution of judge to give a preference to insider against outsider of the local administrative border.
According to the descriptive statistics, ‘enforcement technology’ in China seems to have the fol-
lowing characteristics: First, the enforcement probability of the payment contract is far below 100
percent. Enforcement here appears to be imperfect as assumed in our theoretical model. Second,
enforcement appears to be carried out by local governments. Third, court enforcement is biased to
give a preference to local firms within the court’s jurisdiction.
A survey of the firms in China is used in this paper to document inter-firm financial flow and
to examine what kind of enforcement mechanism works in trade credit contracting. The survey
gives data on the firm’s trade with specific customers and suppliers from two groups: inside and
outside of administrative border of the city that surveyed firms reside. This information allowed us
to identify the influence of characteristics of trading partner, e.g. ownership, industry, cash position,
etc. Particularly, we focus on different enforcement mechanism among different types of ownership.
As we can easily imagine, private ownership has less to do with administrative power over the
enforcement mechanism related with trading. On the contrary, the state ownership is likely to have a
close relationship with local governments, and it can take an advantage of their administrative power.
Enforcement of the local governments is bureaucratic-control in nature, which will be limited within
administrative area, and might be biased against some of the related party. We will use the ownership
type as a proxy for closeness with local government to identify the effects of enforceability on trade
credit financing.
Our main findings are that (a) trade credits are mainly offered and received by the state sector, (b)
the privately owned firms receive credits mainly from the state sector, (c) however, we cannot find
evidence that the state sector’s enforcement is less effective than privately owned firms in terms of
default probability of trade credits. Moreover, enforcement by the state sector may be more effective
than that by private sector. (d) These results raise a possibility that the state ownership, despite being
inefficient as a producer, may have been an effective supplier of credits that helped sustain the high
macroeconomic growth.
II Imperfect Enforcement and Trade Credit Contract
Our aim is firstly to document firm’s decision over providing and receiving trade credit among
mixed types of ownerships in China, secondly to show how different types of ownership have an
access to different types of enforcement mechanism that result in different levels of ‘enforcement
technology.’
Trade credit is an important financing source in everywhere in the world. Account payable has the
largest or second largest shares in liability among G7 countries; 15% of total assets for non financial
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of U.S. firms, 15.4% for Japan, 17% for France, 14.7% for Italy, 13.7% for U.K. 13.3% for Canada,
and 11.5% for Germany (Rajan and Zingales [1995]). This is the same for developing economies
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic [2001]).The existence and use of trade credit have been explained
from three aspects: 1) financing advantage theories, 2) price discrimination strategies or industrial
organization, and 3) transaction theories (Petersen and Rajan [1997]).
The first approach claims that trade credit has an advantage in obtaining information on borrower
compared to formal lending from financial institutions, and it is a substitute to bank lending. Em-
pirical studies based on data of US supported that trade credit is preferred over bank loan when it
has informational advantages on borrower’s creditworthiness or quality of products (Petersen and
Rajan [1997], Ng, Kiholm Smith and Smith [1999], Berger and Udell [1995], [2001]). Investigation
on Japanese data finds that manufacturing industry shows transaction motives, though the service
sector shows financial motives (Emery, Ariga and Kawaguchi [1999]).
In developing economies, Fafchamps [2000] finds that ethnic and gender bias is noticeable in ob-
taining supplier credit, where the network effects among the groups play an important role in this
bias, which suggests that network facilitates enforcement in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Cross country
studies showed that when financial institutions are weak and minor as a supplier of fund, the indus-
tries with higher dependence on trade credit shows higher growth. However, the industrial growth is
attributed to aged firms, reflecting an existence of barriers to access to trade credit among younger
firms (Fishman and Love [2002]).
Contract theory literature, the second approach, attempts to analyze how trade credit contract
comes to be facilitated. If the payment cannot be enforced effectively, trade credit contract will not
be taken place. Relational contract based on informal relationship are regarded as a substitute the
formal law and courts. McMillan and Woodruff [1999] documented what kind of factor facilitated
trade credit in a framework of relational contracting between customers and suppliers. Johnson,
McMillan and Woodruff [2002] documented that relational contract are strengthened and trading
will be expanded when the courts works more effectively.
Recent law and growth literature, the third approach, also refers to trade credit. The litera-
ture claims that British common-law origin legal system is superior to others as it promotes eco-
nomic growth with strong protections of the shareholder and creditors (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, Vishny [1998][2000], LLSV hereafter), and with more efficient court system (Djankov, La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer [2003]).
Allen et al [2003] have shown, however, that People’s Republic of China is a good counterexample
against propositions of the LLSV. PRC represents ‘gradual transition strategy’ among post-planned
economy, who enjoyed a rapid expansion of economic activities without a substantial withdrawal of
government commitment. In China, the informal sector (including both private and quasi-state sec-
tors by their definition) is very active, and this is a primary reason for this country’s rapid economic
growth, though the legal enforcement mechanism such as protection of shareholder or creditor is
quite poor and the private sector is apparently discriminated by the financial institutions on financ-
ing (Brandt and Li [2002]).
These literatures suggest that there exist effective alternative financing channels and governance
mechanisms for the informal sector in China, such as those based on reputation and relationships,
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to support high growth of Chinese economy. However, the informal sector in China does not have
economic activity only within itself, but have deep interaction with the state sector. In addition, they
have not explained what kind of informal mechanisms actually work in China.
Regarding to trade credit, Takamizawa [2006] documents that legal institution that facilitate credit
recovery are weak, and its conflicts are very prevailing in China. Under this environment, Ito [2006]
found that the state sector is more active in utilizing trade credit. Referring to these findings, Yana-
gawa [2006] extends a theoretical explanation that more certain enforcement technology will pro-
mote both provision of trade credit as well as the volume of economic activities.
Our paper focuses on the point that state owned firms or quasi-state owned firms play a substan-
tial role in supply and contract enforcement to facilitate trade credit in the Chinese economy. State
owned firms have a ‘relationship’ with the legal enforcement sector, and this ‘relationship’ may help
to enhance informal mechanisms for enforcement. The novel in our findings is that the state owner-
ship could have provided the private sector with trade credit and related enforcement mechanism.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 3 will give a theoretical model that explain what happens
trade credit flow between government and non-government ownerships. Sections 4 to 6 document
empirical studies that include descriptive data and regression results that test our hypothesis based
on our original survey in China. Discussion and conclusions are given in Section 6.
III Theoretical Model
III.1 A Simple Model of Imperfect Enforcement
In order to explain the mechanism of trade credit, we consider a simple buyer-seller model. We
assume here that the value function of a buyer is V(X) = vX, and the cost function of a seller is
C(X) = cX, where X is the trade volume that is endogenously determined in the negotiation process
of the buyer and the seller. By assuming that v and c are exogenously given v > c, the first best trade
volume is infinite. If there is an imperfect enforcement problem as we will explain below, however,
it is not optimal for the seller to provide the first best trade volume.
The imperfect enforcement problem we are thinking about is as follows. Usually the trading price
P is determined to be between v and c in order to realize a trade transaction. Even if it is impossible
for the buyer to pay the price immediately, the seller can provide a trade credit, and an efficient
transaction can be realized. It is assumed here, however, that enforcement for the payment contract
is imperfect. Even if buyers promise to pay the contracted price, they may not pay the total promised
payment by the promised date. In such a situation, desirable trade may not be realized.
At time 1, the buyer and seller agree to trade a product; they make a contract specifying the
payment schedule. In order to deliver the product at time 1, the seller incurs the cost for production
C(X) and plans to receive payment sufficient for the cost. Conversely, the buyer receives the product
at time 1 but will get profit from the product, V(X), only at time 2. The buyer may thus have to
receive trade credit from the seller. It is assumed here that the buyer has cash A in period 1, and the
buyer has to borrow (PX − A) from the seller. Also, for simplicity, no time discount is assumed. As
long as the buyer pays (PX−A) at time 2 according to the contract, the seller can in the final analysis
receive PX.
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If enforcement for the contract is imperfect, however, the situation above may change drastically.
The seller has an incentive not to pay (PX −A) at time 2. To formulate the strategic default incentive
for the buyer, we assume that the seller can seize only a part of the buyer’s benefit, svX even if the
default occurs. s is the enforcement technology of the seller and we assume s < 1. This means that
the buyer need not to repay (1− s)vX. In this situation, the contracted price P is almost meaningless.
Even if they have agreed to pay a very high price, they can expect that the buyer will default and the
seller gets only svX. Hence the price is set so as to satisfy the following condition.
PX = svX + A
Suppose the buyer is a monopoly buyer of the product, and that the bargaining power of the buyer
is 100%. The equilibrium price is set to maximize the profit of the buyer under constraints that
will be explained below. This supposition can simplify the explanation. Qualitative results are not
affected, though the bargaining power is less than 100%. The total amount of cash that the buyer has
is assumed to be A. Under this situation, the problem of the buyer becomes as follows.
max
{X,T }
vX − svX − T
s.t. svX + T ≥ cX
T ≤ A
Although the total amount of cash that the buyer has is A, here we consider a possibility that the
contracted cash payment, T , is smaller than A. Hence we must consider the second constraint,
although we can easily prove that the optimal T is equal to A. As we explained above the maximum
gain of the seller is svX + T. Since the gain must be higher that the production cost, we get the first
constraint.
By solving the above problem, we get the following result as long as c > sv.
X∗ = A
c−sv
P∗ = sv + AX∗
T ∗ = A.
If c is smaller than sv, the imperfect enforcement does not become a problem for the seller and
X∗ becomes infinite. Since we are interested in the imperfect enforcement situation, hereafter we
assume that c > sv.
The above result shows the equilibrium trade volume X∗ is an increasing function of A and s.
Moreover the amount of trade credit is also an increasing function of A and s.
Proposition III.1 The equilibrium trade volume and trade credit are increasing functions of A, s.
This proposition means that the enforcement mechanism is important for the trade volume and the
profit of the buyer. If the enforcement technology is too low (s is very low), the buyer will tend to
default. Even if s is low, however, when A is sufficiently high, the seller’s profit can still be high.
III.2 Sequential Trading
Next we will consider the following sequential trading model to examine the roles of government-
owned firms. At time 1, a government-owned firm and a buyer agree a sales contract but a part of the7
payment will be done at time 2, that is the government-owned firm gives trade credit to the buyer as
we explained above. At time 3, the government-owned firm buys some products from a seller, which
gives trade credit to the government owned firm. At time 4, the government owned firm returns the
trade credit to the seller.
The relation between the government owned firm and the buyer is just same as the previous sub-
section. The value function of a buyer is V(X) = vX, and the cost function of the government owned
firm is C(X) = cX. Since the buyer has only A at time 1, it has to borrow (PX − A) from the gov-
ernment owned firm but the government owned firm can expect to get back only sGvX. Then the
equilibrium trade volume becomes X∗ = A/(c − sGv) and the government-owned firm gets the cash
(i.e.the total sales), AG, becomes
AG = sGvX∗ + A =
sGvA
c − sGv + A =
c
c − sGv A
We can easily see that AG is an increasing function of sG and A, and moreover AG is larger than A.
Next we consider the relation between the government-owned firm and the seller. One important
point is that the above AGbecomes the upfront cash the government-owned firm can pay. Here we
assume that the benefit function of the government-owned firm is U(Y) = uY , and the cost function
of the seller is is D(Y) = dY . Since the government owned firm has AG at time 3, it has to borrow
(PY − AG) from the seller. On the other hand the seller can expect to get only suY , where s is
the enforcement technology of the seller. Hence we get that the equilibrium trade volume becomes
Y∗ = AGd−su .
An interesting point is this trade volume and the trade credit from the seller to the government-
owned firm are dependent upon the enforcement technology of the government owned firm, sG. To
prove this point, we rewrite Y∗ as follows,
Y∗ =
AG
d − su =
c
(c − sGv)(d − su) A.
Hence we can easily see that Y∗ is an increasing function of sG. The equilibrium trade credit from
the seller to the government-owned firm is suY∗ − AG, that is
suY∗ − AG = suA
G
d − su − A
G =
d
d − su A
G =
d
(c − sGv)(d − su) A.
Thus even the equilibrium trade credit is an increasing function of sG.
Proposition III.2 The equilibrium trade volume and trade credit from a seller to a government-
owned firm are increasing functions of the enforcement technology of the government-owned firm
sG.
This proposition shows that the enforcement technology has an externality effect. Furthermore we
can easily show that there is a positive externality effect even to the seller since the upfront cash for
the seller is increased by an increase of sG. This means the transaction between another seller and
this seller can be improved by the increase of sG.
This observation suggests that if the government-owned firms in China have better enforcement
technologies than privately-owned firms, those enforcement technologies have positive effects for
promoting total transactions and increase trade credits in China.8
III.3 Behavior of Government-Owned Firms
In the previous subsection, we have assumed that the government-owned firms have better en-
forcement technologies. There is a possibility, however, that they do not have better technology but
they expand their trade credits just because of laziness or other agency problems. Thus we examine
this possibility.
Let us consider the sequential trading model in the previous subsection. Suppose sGis very low,
but the government-owned firm is irrational and expanded the total sales, that is X∗ > A/(c − sGv).
In this case, the trade credit from the government-owned firm to the buyer can be high, since the
trade volume is high. In this case, however, the government-owned firm cannot get sufficient return
at time 2, since the lending is irrational. Hence AG must become very low. Therefore, the total
sales and trade credit from the seller to the government-owned firm must be very low level. In
summary, the trade credit from government-owned firm to privately-owned firms can be increased
by irrational behaviors of government-owned firms but the trade credit from privately-owned firms
to government-owned firms and privately-owned firms to privately owned firms must be decreased
by the irrational behaviors.
IV Data
In the following 3 sections starting from this, we will examine three competing hypothesises on
the role of trade credits offered by government-owned firms, namely:
a. Government-owned firms have a superior enforcement techology, thereby expanding the vol-
umes of trade credits in the economy.
b. Government-owned firms have an inferior enforcement techology, thereby shrinking the vol-
ume of trade credits in the economy.
c. Government-owned firms have an inferior enforcement techology, but they act irrationally
and expand the volume of trade credits.
The first of these have been set forth in the previous subsections as the leading case. The rest is also
consistent with the model we developed.
In what follows, we will point that government-owned firms engage actively in trade credit fi-
nancing, both at lending and borrowing, which rejects the hypothesis b. We will then show in the
discussion, to distinguish between the hypothesises a and c, that rates of nonperforming loans are
not significantly different between government- and nongovermnemt-owned firms, nor is maturity
of loans offered by them. We also observe that lending from nongovernment-owned to government-
owned firms is frequent and large (relative to trade volume). Therefore we conclude that the hypoth-
esis a to be most likely.
IV.1 General Characteristics of the Sampled Firms
Our sampled firms are classified into several ownership types: state-owned, quasistate-owned,
government-supervised, and privately-owned. The state-owned firms are firms whose capital is fully
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owned by the government. The quasistate-owned firms are either collectively owned or whose ma-
jority share holder is a government holding company. The state-supervised firms are private firms
that are under supervision of local government. The private firms are all other firms.
The financial statistics of firms show that state-owned firms are large in size. Table 3 indicates the
state-owned firms are at least three times as large in median as other types in terms of total assets.
Liquidity ratio, or the ratio of liquid assets to liquid liabilities, measures the liquidity of firms. As a
rule-of-thumb it is generally considered 2 as a sound liquidity position of firms. The sampled firms
have lower values, mostly around between 1 and 1.5, and its median value is lowest for the privately-
owned firms.*2 It is interesting that, when we look at the median firms, the privately-owned firms
are the least sound in terms of liquidity ratio. State supervision, on the other hand, may not seem to
help firms to act more prudently, although there is more heterogeneity in private and state-supervised
firms than other types as the large standard deviation shows. The median profit margin is about the
same for all types, although, there is more heterogeneity in state-owned firms that there are a few
firms which have negative profits.
IV.2 Trade Credit Transactions
For trade credit transactions, we focus on whether state and quasistate ownership, or government
ownership in general, result in different patterns and thence effects on the local economy. As ex-
plained in the previous sections, this follows from our casual observation that the transition problem
arises from a combination of both development of market institutions and evolution of government
involvement in economic activities. So we will classify the firm ownership into government-owned
(state-owned and quasistate-owned) and nongovernment-owned (state-supervised and privately-
Table 3: Selected Financial Indicators of Firms by Ownership Types
state owned quasistate
owned
state
supervised
private
total asset (10 million yuan) median 4.49 1.32 1.52 1.27
mean 7.75 2.31 2.29 1.96
std dev 11.06 2.18 3.03 2.25
liquid assets/total asset (%) median 0.48 0.48 0.43 0.41
mean 0.42 0.47 0.44 0.56
std dev 0.27 0.34 0.22 0.75
liquid liabilities/total asset (%) median 0.38 0.44 0.55 0.48
mean 0.46 0.70 0.55 0.65
std dev 0.32 0.73 0.27 0.88
liquidity ratio median 1.01 1.09 0.86 0.85
mean 1.02 1.06 1.56 1.20
std dev 0.39 0.76 4.37 1.36
total profit/total asset (%) median 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
mean −0.12 0.05 0.03 0.10
std dev 0.42 0.10 0.08 0.36
number of observations 10 9 61 29
Note:
*2Mean value of state-supervised firms is the highest among all ownership types, however, mean is not robust to outliers,
which is shown in the large standard deviation. We will therefore focus on median.
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Table 4: Borrowing, Lending, and its Maturity among Different Ownership Types
sampled firm partner firm min median max mean st dev NA n
lender borrower   
government-owned 0 95 100 72.00 40.50 2 12
government-owned
nongovernment-owned 0 100 100 69.42 36.23 2 28
government-owned 0 90 100 64.39 42.61 7 68
nongovernment-owned
nongovernment-owned 0 35 100 44.43 40.04 7 117
lender borrower    ()
government-owned 7 30 60 34.20 16.59 2 12
government-owned
nongovernment-owned 1 30 60 21.89 15.48 2 28
government-owned 0 30 180 40.88 41.14 11 68
nongovernment-owned
nongovernment-owned 1 30 180 30.95 31.31 8 117
borrower lender   
government-owned 0 100 100 70.77 45.91 5 18
government-owned
nongovernment-owned 0 65 100 52.90 45.01 6 25
government-owned 0 60 100 48.22 44.33 13 58
nongovernment-owned
nongovernment-owned 0 50 100 48.25 43.02 20 135
borrower lender    ()
government-owned 7 15 45 21.46 14.10 5 18
government-owned
nongovernment-owned 1 12 30 16.35 12.38 8 25
government-owned 1 23 90 22.83 19.86 16 58
nongovernment-owned
nongovernment-owned 0 20 111 21.15 18.32 25 135
Note: Average of top in-the-city and top out-of-city transactions as proportions to value of each transactions
(in per cent). Government-owned firms are state-owned and quasistate-owned firms. Non-government-
owned firms are all other firms. Quasistate-owned firms are collective firms and firms whose majority
share holder is public holding company. State supervised firms are under supervision of local govern-
ment. Private firms are all other firms.
Figure 2: Median Credit Flows between Firms
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Note: G is government-owned, N is nongovernment-owned firms. Circled firm is the sampled firm, squared firms
are its transaction partners. Arrows indicate direction of credit flows, and lending is through sales and
borrowing is through procurement. Values indicate median proportion of credit in each transactions.
owned). A corollary to government involvement in economic activity is the effects of municipal
borders on trade credits. Partly out from altruistic consideration, partly out from a desire to share
the rents from protection, local governments often favor local firms by invoking some ad hoc
principles in dispute settlements, which create a barrier in trade across municipalities. We will
therefore distinguish whether transactions stay within the border or go beyond it, ‘in-the-city’ and
‘out-of-city’ in our terminology.
If we look into the payment of transactions, there are a few differences in lending and borrowing
through trade credits by ownership types.*3 Table 4 summarizes borrowing in procurement and
lending in sales transactions, against government-owned and non-government-owned firms. Figure
2 shows the median credit flows for government- and nongovernment-owned firms against both
government- and nongovernment-owned firms.
*3Borrowing in sales (prepayment) and lending in procurement (prepayment) are less prevalent, and the net effects are
lending in sales and borrowing in procurement. So we will not consider these transactions.
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One can see that the government-owned firms use more borrowing and lending. In median,
government-owned firms lend at 95 and 100 per cent towards government- and nongovernment-
owned firms, respectively, while nongovernment-owned firms lend at 90 and 35 per cent, respec-
tively. Results are similar in borrowing, that government-owned borrows from government- and
nongovernment-owned at 100 and 65 per cent, respectively, whereas the corresponding numbers
for nongovernment-owned are 60 and 50. Thus lending through postpayments in sales operations
is also more frequent among government-owned firms, especially against non-government-owned
firms. Borrowing through postpayments in procurement operations is generally more frequent with
government-owned firms, especially against government-owned firms.
In Table 4, maturity of trade credits has the same median values for both types of firms in lending
operations. We see a larger variability among nongovernment-owned firms, with standard deviation
about twice or more than the government-owned firms. This is partly because some of them lend in
longer maturity of 180 days while the government-owned firms maxes out at 60 days. In borrowing
operations, government-owned firms receive shorter maturity credits. The difference in standard
deviations between two types of firms are not as large as in lending. So maturity data suggests a
general pattern that government-owned firms lend longer and borrow shorter. Credit contents of
transactions show they lend and borrow more.
This is somewhat inconsistent with the popularly held notion that government-ownership involves
strong-arm tactics and reneging on debts. Rather, it suggests the otherwise that they not just actively
engage in trade credit financing and follow contractual agreements relatively well whenever they
borrow, but also offer credits in more generous terms. Such a characterization is more suited to
efficiency than strong-arm tactics.
V Estimation
To confirm above results in detail, we first use FGLS to run a two-equation system of borrowing
yb,i and lending yl,i of firms, and evaluate the estimates using robust standard errors (Wooldridge
[2003:7.49]).
yk,i = α′k dk,i + β′kxk,i + ek,i, k = b, l
where dk,i is a vector of ownership dummies of respondent firms interacted with dummies indicating
whether the partner is located in the city or out of city, xk,i is a vector of controls such as industry
dummies (manufacturing, distribution/retail, partner is manufacturing), a dummy variable indicating
if the product being traded is considered to be ‘unique’ by the respondent firm, a dummy variable
if the respondent considers there is a rival firm to the respondent. Uniqueness, rivalry, and years of
transactions are included to control for market power of the firms. We expect uniqueness to have
a positive estimate as it increases the costs of defaults. Rivalry will undermine the reputation built
on long-term relationship, because either party has an outside option. Years of transactions is not a
forward-looking variable thus does not necessarily predict less defaults, however, the fact that the
relationship lasted longer can imply that switching to other trade partners will be costly. So we
expect a positive estimate on the last variable.
It is probably necessary to include total sales and total purchase of firms in each regressions to
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control for the size effects on trade credits. As transaction is considered to be endogenous, we need
instruments. However, it is difficult to find valid instruments, and we decided not to include these
variables.*4 Firm asset sizes or other size proxies may be argued to serve as instruments, however,
the past choices of the largest transaction partners and the use of trade credits in them should have, at
least, some effects on firm growth, which nullify the validity requirement of instrumental variables.
To control for the size effects, next, we use ratios of lending and borrowing yi ∈ [0, 1] in each
transactions as regressand, where we dropped l subscript. As yi is a limited dependent variable, one
cannot use OLS to consistently estimate the parameters of interest. As it is a continuous variable, we
lose information if we use discrete response models. We will thus use the fractional logit model that
gives consistent estimates of parameters in continuous limited-dependent variable regressions (as
discussed in Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). It is based on the theory of quasi-maximum likelihood
estimation (QMLE), and we maximize the Bernoulli likelihood of:
li (γ) = yi ln [G (γ′zi)] + (1 − yi) ln [1 −G (γ′zi)] ,
where G(a) = 11+e−a , zi = (d′i x′i)′, γ = (α′ β′)′. Robust standard errors are obtained from square
roots of diagonal elements in
ˆV[γ] = ˆA−1 ˆB ˆA−1/n,
where n is sample size and
ˆA =
n∑
i=1
gˆ2i
ˆGi(1 − ˆGi)
z′izi, ˆB =
n∑
i=1
(
uˆigˆi
ˆGi(1 − ˆGi)
)2
z′izi,
and ˆGi = G(γˆ′zi), g(a) = ∂G(a)∂a , gˆi = g(γˆ′zi), and uˆi = yi − ˆGi.
VI Estimated Results
When we regress amount of lending and borrowing through trade credits on ownership types and
other control variables, government-owned firms are shown to be actively engaged in trade credit
financing. T 5 shows the estimated results. The columns (1) and (4) are the base regressions
that include only ownership and location dummies. (2) and (5) add industry dummies, and (3) and
(6) further add characteristics of market competition. The default lending pattern is nongovernment-
owned to nongovernment-owned.
As can be seen, lending by nongovernment-owned firms to government-owned firms is greater
than the default lending pattern. Borrowing by government-owned firms from government-owned
firms are also shown to be greater than the default. The out-of-city dummies are generally negative,
indicating they lend or borrow less in out-of-city transactions, but they are not statistically significant.
In T 6, we have distinguished in-the-city and out-of-city transactions for each ownership types.
The results show that nongovernment-owned lends more to government-owned for in-the-city trades,
although the difference over the corresponding government-owned lending to government-owned
in-the-city trades are not significant in most cases (test statistics are not shown). In borrowing,
*4Preceding research simply includes these variables without consideration of endogeneity (Rajan and Zingales [1997],
McMillan and Woodruff [1999], Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff [2002]).
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government-owned firms are receiving credits from the peer, government-owned firms in-the-city,
whose differences over borrowing of nongovernment-owned from in-the-city government-owned
firms are statistically significant. This confirms the previous observation we found using the descrip-
tive statistics. The overall differences between all (gov-nongov) trades and all (nongov-nongov)
trades give significant p values, so do the stronger rejection of the null of ‘(gov-gov)-(nongov-gov),
in is zero’. One also notes the negative estimates on out-of-city dummies that show smaller lending
and borrowing relative to in-the-city transactions.
These results, despite revealing interesting patterns, are not precisely estimated in two senses; first
in large standard errors, second in not being able to control for the size of transactions, which should
generate omitted variable biases in the unknown direction.
In T 7, we turn to credit ratios by using fractional logit models to control for the transaction
sizes. We have used lending ratios, or the proportion of postpayments, in sales, and borrowing ratios,
or the proportion of postpayments, in procurement. We find that, lending ratios are greater (a) be-
tween government-owned firms, and (b) from nongovernment-owned to government-owned firms.
In borrowing, most of the estimates are imprecisely estimated. However, point estimates show that
borrowing between government-owned, and borrowing of government-owned from nongovernment-
owned are positive, which are consistent with (a) and (b), respectively. We note that, compared to
(2), out-of-city dummy becomes significantly positive but smaller, when we add market power vari-
ables in specification (3). This indicates lending ratios offered to out-of-city partners are positively
correlated with these market power variables. This is reasonable when we look at point estimates
of uniqueness of the product and years of transactions, as they would enhance reputation through
greater costs of defaults and greater incidence of non-defaults. The positive sign of rival is puz-
zling as we expect rivalry undermines reputation. This may be capturing the effects of competition,
which may not be compatible with a Pareto-superior equilibrium where lenders offer more credits
and borrowers default less (relative to a Pareto-inferior one where lenders offer less credits and bor-
rowers default more often). The estimates on market power variables are, however, all insignificant
at conventional levels.
In T 8, the distinction between in-the-city and out-of-city transactions are considered explic-
itly. This shows lending ratios are greater for (c) government-owned firms to in-the-city partners,
and borrowing ratios are greater for (d) government-owned firms from in-the-city partners. These
confirm that government-owned firms are generally active in extending and receiving credits for in-
the-city trades. The estimate on out-of-city dummy in (3) has also similar values and result as in
T 7.
When we use the more detailed classification of trades, we can generally confirm the finding of (a)
to (d), but in a more specified manner. In T 9, we distinguished ownership types and destination
of transactions. We see that government-owned firms lend more to out-of-city government-owned
partners than nongovernment-owned firms, which we previously identified as (a). Government-
owned firms lend more also to nongovernment-owned firms in-the-city, which corresponds to find-
ing (c). Nongovernment-owned firms lend more to government-owned firms in-the-city, which is
basically same as finding (b). Both types of firms do not lend aggressively to nongovernment-owned
firms out-of-city (relative to the default of between nongovernment lending in-the-city), as estimates
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are all not significantly different from zero. The statistically significant and large borrowing ratios
between government-owned firms in-the-city are notable. This is a reconfirmation of finding (d).
Finding (d) is also consistent with positive and significant estimates on borrowing of government-
owned from nongovernment-owned in-the-city, although the size of estimates is smaller. The out-
of-city dummy in (3) again gives similar values as in T 7, indicating a robust positive correlation
between lending ratios and market power variables. The overall χ2 tests on equality in all gov vari-
ables and corresponding nongov variables are rejected.
Table 5: Estimated Results of Lending in Sales and Borrowing in Procurement
Lending in Sales (10 thousand yuan) Borrowing in Procurement (10 thousand yuan)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
intercept 244.654∗∗∗ 42.515 −38.692 158.987∗∗∗ 150.687∗∗ 237.582∗∗(94.706) (134.492) (161.841) (47.336) (65.873) (116.143)
government-government −30.588 43.423 19.851 118.280∗ 145.434∗∗ 89.775∗(91.330) (102.838) (119.484) (79.408) (86.374) (65.577)
government-nongovernment −55.876∗ −22.982 −38.860 −68.002∗∗ −60.343∗ −32.053(42.314) (52.890) (57.223) (39.206) (40.724) (54.792)
nongovernment-government 236.079∗∗ 186.293∗∗ 199.710∗ 46.940 55.418 17.312(119.075) (98.647) (125.206) (44.308) (47.209) (43.681)
out of city −103.051 −106.486 −110.953 −30.358 −26.188 −9.020(112.179) (115.341) (119.362) (54.780) (56.667) (48.627)
manufacturing 154.834∗∗ 163.950∗∗ 37.603 37.757(70.881) (90.961) (45.843) (41.512)
partner is manufacturing 192.909∗ 155.663 −32.148 −5.267(122.782) (148.804) (50.852) (49.048)
distibution/retail 57.712 55.241 −31.240 −14.592(75.628) (88.200) (57.474) (46.230)
unique 85.175(141.606)
rival −1.282 −174.146∗∗(107.599) (104.942)
length 10.247 6.744∗(8.765) (4.187)
(gov-gov)-(nongov-gov) 0.930∗ 0.785 0.850 0.610 0.682 0.711
obs 172 172 170 170 161 161
Note: FGLS estimates. Default ownership is nongovernment-owned. p values are reported in (gov-gov)-(nongov-gov) differences.
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Table 6: Estimated Results of Lending in Sales and Borrowing in Procurement to In-The-City and
Out-Of-City Firms
Lending in Sales Borrowing in Procurement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
intercept 228.588∗∗∗ 33.681 −71.123 192.260∗∗∗ 192.349∗∗∗ 241.602∗∗(90.91) (139.142) (167.232) (53.202) (74.178) (117.65)
government-government, in 144.274 197.101∗ 213.579 280.128∗∗∗ 320.748∗∗∗ 223.005∗∗∗(126.485) (145.692) (176.492) (42.444) (71.098) (61.123)
government-government, out −191.859∗∗∗ −43.811 32.663 152.478 158.595 70.045(57.06) (112.978) (117.744) (138.983) (151.701) (105.527)
government-nongovernment, in 11.551 52.064 38.165 −25.626 −16.972 26.327(35.774) (64.989) (70.995) (55.981) (63.270) (55.697)
government-nongovernment, out −17.150 21.594 −37.599 −166.730∗∗∗ −158.673∗∗∗ −173.873∗∗∗(43.345) (76.140) (66.501) (42.769) (55.659) (63.757)
nongovernment-government, in 577.599∗∗∗ 539.140∗∗∗ 531.046∗∗ 58.114 43.555 70.023(244.844) (224.224) (252.12) (70.867) (62.470) (75.375)
nongovernment-government, out 197.691∗ 154.012 191.452 53.335 65.633 57.894(138.227) (127.642) (172.325) (71.292) (79.425) (57.710)
nongovernment-nongovernment,
out
58.030 46.160 18.140 −74.000∗ −75.879∗ −74.346∗
(51.318) (54.730) (58.979) (48.894) (48.948) (45.261)
out of city −138.292 −141.288 −125.121 −30.098 −29.869 −16.347(111.037) (115.729) (119.124) (54.562) (56.154) (47.740)
manufacturing 149.948∗ 181.691∗ 21.922 21.054(92.024) (113.472) (51.687) (45.315)
partner is manufacturing 183.943∗ 150.443 −10.584 2.435(119.799) (143.562) (44.844) (44.532)
distibution/retail 44.422 20.979 −36.188 −36.827(73.614) (84.659) (59.275) (45.504)
unique 23.096(147.051)
rival 8.679 −139.320∗(99.492) (103.57)
length 11.772∗ 7.694∗∗(8.461) (4.172)
(gov-gov)-(nongov-gov), in 0.883 0.810 0.783 1.000∗∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗ 0.914∗
(gov-gov)-(nongov-gov), out 0.993∗∗∗ 0.849 0.626 0.508 0.431 0.090
(gov-nongov)-(nongov-nongov),
out
0.811 0.223 0.504 1.000∗∗∗ 0.865 0.916∗
obs 172 172 170 170 161 161
Note: FGLS estimates. Default transaction type is nongovernment-nongovernment, in-the-city transactions.
Table 7: Estimated Results of Ratios of Lending in Sales and Borrowing in Procurement,
Fractional Logit Models
Lending Ratio in Sales (per cent) Borrowing Ratio in Procurement (per cent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
intercept 0.024 −0.378 −1.159 0.346∗ 0.120 0.493(0.212) (0.424) (0.580) (0.253) (0.507) (0.659)
government-government 1.299∗∗ 1.465∗∗ 1.516∗∗ 0.458 0.825 0.830(0.594) (0.738) (0.746) (0.568) (0.703) (0.736)
government-nongovernment 0.533∗ 0.598∗ 0.430 0.172 0.289 0.277(0.392) (0.439) (0.457) (0.627) (0.605) (0.608)
nongovernment-government 0.601∗∗ 0.580∗∗ 0.445∗ −0.115 −0.019 −0.135(0.284) (0.308) (0.306) (0.331) (0.346) (0.358)
out of city −0.114 0.232 0.065∗∗∗ 0.095 −0.207 −0.015(0.252) (0.348) (0.025) (0.297) (0.384) (0.024)
manufacturing −0.154 −0.152 0.130 0.127(0.257) (0.265) (0.306) (0.314)
partner is manufacturing 0.304 0.594∗ 0.481 0.570(0.377) (0.407) (0.435) (0.447)
distibution/retail 0.210 0.132 −0.342 −0.293(0.379) (0.398) (0.396) (0.397)
unique 0.136(0.369)
rival 0.073 −0.109(0.310) (0.404)
length 0.272 −0.373(0.430) (0.514)
(gov-gov)-(nongov-gov) 0.787 0.728 0.779 0.803 0.846 0.875
Note: Fractional logit estimates with response yi ∈ [0, 1], where we divided borrowing and lending with sales and purchase,
respectively. A Bernoulli log-likelihood with li(β) = yi ln[G(β′xi)] + (1 − yi) ln[1 − G(β′xi)] where G(a) = 11+e−a is
maximized. Robust standard errors are in parenthesises. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.
(gov-gov)-(nongov-gov) shows p values for the test of equal estimates. Default transaction type is nongovernment-owned
firms in-the-city.
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Table 8: Estimated Results of Ratios of Lending in Sales and Borrowing in Procurement,
Fractional Logit Models
Lending Ratio in Sales (per cent) Borrowing Ratio in Procurement (per cent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
intercept 0.276 0.087 −0.841 0.572∗∗ 0.393 0.443(0.217) (0.405) (0.552) (0.264) (0.523) (0.689)
government, in 0.963∗∗ 0.962∗∗ 0.839∗∗ 2.118∗∗∗ 2.265∗∗∗ 2.170∗∗∗(0.419) (0.475) (0.497) (0.564) (0.691) (0.698)
government, out −0.150 −0.246 −0.552 −0.927 −0.671 −0.824(0.496) (0.526) (0.544) (0.607) (0.686) (0.704)
nongovernment, out 0.132 0.123 −0.023 −0.518 −0.545 −0.706(0.273) (0.280) (0.290) (0.308) (0.318) (0.330)
out of city −0.196 0.255 0.062∗∗∗ −0.028 −0.110 0.009(0.248) (0.323) (0.024) (0.291) (0.395) (0.024)
manufacturing −0.211 −0.253 0.065 0.078(0.253) (0.260) (0.301) (0.316)
partner is manufacturing −0.080 0.166 0.376 0.483(0.358) (0.373) (0.417) (0.421)
distibution/retail 0.461∗ 0.456∗ −0.282 −0.176(0.332) (0.347) (0.386) (0.394)
unique 0.312(0.347)
rival 0.037 0.022(0.301) (0.407)
length 0.460 −0.184(0.402) (0.502)
govout-nongovout 0.493 0.564 0.588 0.164 0.737 0.160
Note: See Table 7.
Table 9: Estimated Results of Ratios of Lending in Sales and Borrowing in Procurement,
Fractional Logit Models
Lending Ratio in Sales (per cent) Borrowing Ratio in Procurement (per cent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
intercept −0.065 −0.452 −1.296 0.577∗∗ 0.757 1.064∗(0.253) (0.434) (0.598) (0.305) (0.617) (0.752)
government-government, in 1.411∗ 1.516∗ 1.592∗ 15.665∗∗∗ 15.798∗∗∗ 15.595∗∗∗(0.921) (1.043) (1.038) (0.755) (0.885) (0.936)
government-government, out 3.071∗∗∗ 3.241∗∗∗ 3.167∗∗∗ −0.512 −0.458 −0.565(0.738) (0.821) (0.888) (0.824) (0.898) (0.921)
government-nongovernment, in 0.993∗∗ 1.058∗∗ 0.933∗∗ 1.780∗∗∗ 1.910∗∗∗ 1.802∗∗∗(0.439) (0.485) (0.550) (0.578) (0.695) (0.703)
government-nongovernment, out 0.205 0.247 −0.143 −3.160 −2.979 −3.127(0.564) (0.630) (0.613) (0.952) (1.100) (1.168)
nongovernment-government, in 0.846∗∗ 0.811∗∗ 0.645∗ 0.454 0.444 0.136(0.423) (0.418) (0.394) (0.583) (0.609) (0.617)
nongovernment-government, out 0.772∗∗ 0.713∗ 0.486 −0.085 0.048 −0.147(0.427) (0.440) (0.454) (0.446) (0.459) (0.474)
nongovernment-nongovernment, out 0.234 0.212 0.052 −0.869 −0.984 −1.126(0.329) (0.338) (0.354) (0.379) (0.413) (0.427)
out of city −0.120 0.239 0.067∗∗∗ 0.139 −0.620 0.002(0.253) (0.346) (0.026) (0.307) (0.455) (0.023)
manufacturing −0.155 −0.150 0.154 0.131(0.260) (0.266) (0.316) (0.326)
partner is manufacturing 0.267 0.540∗ 0.305 0.371(0.378) (0.412) (0.449) (0.454)
distibution/retail 0.283 0.245 −0.512 −0.440(0.366) (0.379) (0.434) (0.436)
unique 0.207(0.367)
rival 0.028 −0.503(0.319) (0.473)
length 0.378 −0.340(0.434) (0.502)
all (gov vs. nongov) 0.992∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗ 0.987∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗
Note: p values are shown in all (gov vs. nongov) for a test of all coefficients on gov variables are the same with respective
nongov variables. Default transaction type is between nongovernment-owned in-the-city.
VII Discussions and Conclusions
The estimated results that government-owned firms actively engage in trade credit financing can
be interpreted in two ways: the government-owned firms are incapable of managing efficiently and
employ lax trade credit policies, thus they lend and borrow more, or the government-owned firms
are more efficient in enforcing contracts that they can safely lend and borrow more.
We will argue that it is likely that enforcement by government-owned firms are not less effective,
and probably more effective, relative to nongovernment-owned firms. This conjecture is consistent
with anecdotes that government-owned firms use ties with local government in their economic ac-
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Table 10: Differences in Group Means of Existence of Bad
Loans by Ownership
government-owned nongovernment-owned
median 1.000 1.000
mean 0.579 0.756
difference −0.177
p value 0.171
weighted median 0.594 1.435
weighted mean 10.593 5.336
difference 5.257
p value 0.611
Note: Difference in means and weighted means of existence of unrepaid
trade credits in the last three years. p-values of Welch’s t-test
for the null of equality in means with unequal variances are in
parenthesises. Weights are inverse of total sales, so the means are
normalized with sales size. Weighted medians also use the same
weights.
Table 11: Differences in Group Means of Deviations in Credit
Maturity Offered by Sampled Firms
government-owned nongovernment-owned
to government-owned firms
median 0.000 0.000
mean 5.833 −11.813
difference 17.646
p value 0.214
to nongovernment-owned firms
median 0.000 0.000
mean 1.667 −9.840
difference 11.507
p value 0.240
Note: For each firms, a difference in maturity to the top customer over
firm’s average maturity in all lending transactions is computed, and
then group means are taken. p-values of Welch’s t-test for the null
of equality in means with unequal variances are in parenthesises.
tivities. If we accept this view, it is interesting to note that government-owned firms do not seem
to have sufficiently large leverage to extend their lending beyond borders: they do not lend or bor-
row as much as they do with in-the-city clients. This implies that the enforceability of contracts by
government-owned firms does not extend beyond the administrative boundaries. This is consistent
with their ties with government being mostly of local nature.
Note that it can, in principle, also be consistent with an interpretation that greater engagement in
trade credits by the government-owned firms is due to their smaller bargaining powers of vis-a-vis
their trading partners. So let us take a look at if the firms have bad loans in the past three years, as
it should give some information on deterrence of willful defaults or so-called ex post moral hazard.
Table 10 examines the differences in medians, means, weighted medians, and weighted means of loan
defaults in both types of firms. Weights are inverse of firms’ total sales. As one see, unweighted
means show a smaller default experience of government-owned firms.
In weighted data, one sees that the weighted median of government-owned is less than a half of
nongovernment-owned, indicating that government-owned firms are relatively less likely to experi-
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Figure 12: Differences in Median Bad Loan
Experience by Ownership
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Note: Equals to 1 if the firm had at least
one incidence of bad loan in the last
3 years, 0 otherwise. Thus raw data
is binary. A density plot of boot-
strapped distribution of unweighted median
difference between government-owned and
nongovernment-owned firms is shown. Num-
ber of repetition is 10000.
Figure 13: Differences in Weighted Median Bad
Loan Experience by Ownership
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Note: Equals to 1 if the firm had at least 1 in-
cidence of bad loan in the last 3 years, 0
otherwise. Then these values are weighted
with an inverse of total sales of firms. Thus
raw data is continuous. A density plot of
bootstrapped distribution of weighted median
difference between government-owned and
nongovernment-owned firms is shown. Num-
ber of repetition is 10000.
Figure 14: Differences in Median Lend-
ing Maturity Deviations to
Government-Owned Firms
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Note: Deviation in lending maturity is defined as
(lending maturity to the top government-
owned customer)-(average lending maturity
of the firm). A density plot of bootstrapped
distribution of median lending maturity
deviation differences between government-
owned and nongovernment-owned firms,
to government-owned customers is shown.
Number of repetition is 10000.
Figure 15: Differences in Median Lending
Maturity to Nongovernment-
Owned Firms
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Note: Deviation in lending maturity is defined as
(lending maturity to the top nongovernment-
owned customer)-(average lending maturity
of the firm). A density plot of bootstrapped
distribution of median lending maturity
deviation differences between government-
owned and nongovernment-owned firms, to
nongovernment-owned customers is shown.
Number of repetition is 10000.
ence defaults after adjusting for their greater transaction sizes. Note that the incidence of defaults is
not restricted to the transaction with top customers, but refers to all transactions in the past 3 years.
Thus it is not misleading to use total sales as weights in examining normalized (by size) frequency of
defaults. Weighted means show the converse, as there is one influential observation in government-
owned firms whose total sales is far smaller than the average (thus getting a very small denominator)
and is experiencing defaults. All the p values indicate the differences are not significant.
We can see from more robust, median comparison that government-owned firms are relatively
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better in enforcing contracts, although it is difficult to test it formally. As a work around, we have
bootstrapped the differences in median and weighted median, i.e., we have resampled the data with
replacements and have taken median differences. Negative values indicate nongovernment-owned
firms experience more defaults in median. The number of repetition is set to 10000. The results for
unweighted median differences are shown as a density plot in Figure 12, and results for weighted
median differences are shown in Figure 13. One sees that in both weighted and unweighted median
differences, government-owned firms clearly have fewer default experiences in median. It is also
seen that the support of empirical distribution in the weighted median does not extend to positive
values, while in the unweighted median difference cases, the support barely includes positive val-
ues.*5 This does not lend a support to a view that government-owned firms have smaller bargaining
powers that they cannot effectively, relative to nongovernment-owned firms, enforce contracts.
Table 11 examines the differences in medians and means of loan maturity for both types of firms.
The p values indicate there are no significant differences in means. We ran a same resampling
exercise with differences in median maturity deviation toward government-owned firms in Figure
14 and to nongovernment-owned firms in Figure 15. Maturity deviation is defined as the difference
maturity for top customer over average lending maturity of the firm. Subtraction of average maturity
controls for the individual firm effects in lending. The results suggest maturity of government-
owned firms may be longer, but not distinctively so relative to nongovernment-owned firms. There
are, however, some cases that intragovernment-owned lending to be far longer than others.
Another evidence that lends a weak support, or nonrejection, to the efficiency interpretation is
in T 11 where we show the Welch t-tests of difference in means of deviation of maturity. We
first compute the deviation of maturity given to the top customer from average maturity given in
all transactions, where the latter is given as an answer to the question on average maturity. Then
we take group means and compare between groups. Government-owned firms generally give more
maturity to the top customer (relative to firm average), while the nongovernment-owned firms do the
converse. This tendency holds for both transactions with government-owned and nongovernment-
owned customers. The p values are low and does not reject the null of equal deviations between
groups, and thus does not give a decisive evidence against weak enforcement by the government-
owned firms. However, the test results are statistically insignificant, and one should not overextend
its implications.
It is widely recognized that trade credit is an important financial mechanism. In developing
economies, it is a major financing source for economic activity. While enforcement of bank loan
or formal credit is guaranteed by formal legal system and public powers, trade credits rely more
on informal enforcement mechanism between trading partners. Thus, most of transition economies
find themselves with mounting arrears in trade credits, because both formal and informal enforce-
ment mechanisms have not been well established. This paper documents theoretical and empirical
accounts on what facilitates an effective supply of trade credit under such circumstances. We find
that government-owned firms play a significant role as a supplier of trade credits to both private and
government sectors. We also find that incidence of nonperforming loans to be about the same in
*5The fact that the density plot goes beyond 0 into 0.2 is due to smoothing.
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government and private sectors, indicating the former’s enforcement is not less effective. We con-
clude that trade credits given by government-owned firms are a force behind the impressive growth
of Chinese economy.
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A Data
Data was collected at Yibin City, Sichuan Province, in January, 2003. Sample size is 120 with 112
effective responses, collected through interviews. We sampled 85 small and 18 medium scale firms
from all industries without a randomization (Table A1). It sampled from most geographically ap-
proachable firms, thus there may be a selection that most marginally located firms are not included.
However, there are 25 medium scale and 176 small scale firms in the area (National Industrial Statis-
tics, 2002), so our sample has a considerable coverage among firms located not so far away from city
center. We have oversampled medium scale firms to ensure we have sufficient observation of larger
scaled, state-owned firms. Although the selection bias can be considered not to be serious, there may
be a tendency that we overestimate the use of trade credits because geographically clustered firms
may find it easier to extend and receive credits with nearby clusters than with remote firms. Such
a selection bias is mostly controlled with the use of various ownership dummies. Thus we believe
that our sample, despite its relatively small size, does not grossly misstate the actual activities of
state-owned firms. As the state-owned firms are large in scale and small in numbers, our sample,
collected from a single city, has a relatively small number of state-owned firms.
There are 10 state-owned firms, 9 quasistate-owned firms, 61 state-supervised firms, and 29 inde-
pendent, private-owned firms, and 3 NAs for ownership type. State-owned firms are firms classified
according to State Owned Enterprises Law. Quasistate-owned firms include collective firms, limited
or incorporated companies whose majority share holders are government-owned holding compa-
nies. State-supervised firms consist of private-owned firms which has a supervisory authority in
local government. A supervisory authority is an office that oversees firms and provide various kinds
of assistances when needed. Privately-owned firms are all other firms. In Allen et al [2004]’s study,
state-owned firms are classified as ‘formal’ sector, and all other types are classified as ‘informal’
Table A1: Distribution of Total Assets, 2001
size range mean std obs
[16, 500] 250.42 146.10 22
(500, 2000] 1232.89 430.91 45
(2000, 4000] 2867.85 639.82 18
(4000, 36411] 8939.63 7610.78 18
Note: 103 firms gave total asset information. Asset size classifica-
tion in National Industrial Statistics states small to be below
4000 yuan, medium to be above 4000 yuan and below 40000
yuan, large to be above 40000 yuan.
Table A2: Definition of Ownership Types of Sampled Firms
state-owned firms classified as state-owned according to State Owned Enter-
prises Law.
quasistate-owned collective firms, classified by Town and Village Enterprise Law,
limited or incorporated companies whose majority share hold-
ers are government-owned holding companies.
state-supervised private-owned firms which has a supervisory authority in local
government.
private-owned all other firms.
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sector. We call the former two categories jointly as government-owned, and latter two jointly as
nongovernment-owned.
When a firm sells a product with postpayment (late payment), the firm is offering credits. Con-
versely, when a firm buys a product with postpayment, it is receiving credits. Indices of trade credits
we use are amount of late payments in procurement (borrowing), and late payments in sales trans-
actions (lending). We have asked firms to provide information on the largest trading partners in
sales and in procurement among within and outside the city boundary. City boundary distinction is
used to capture if administrative boundaries matter for provision of trade credits. We thus have four
observations of largest trading partners for each firms. We have also asked about ownership types
of these trading partners. (Another measure of trade credits may be days after delivery required to
settle account, but this measure turned out not to produce uniform results across ownership types in
estimation.)
Table A3: Definition of Variables
sales sales in 100 yuan to top selling firm
manufact a dummy variable for partner firm being in manufacturing in-
dustry
distretail a dummy variable for partner firm being in distribution or retail
industries
national a dummy variable for partner firm being government-owned
unq a dummy variable for the good being designed specifically for
sampled firm
rival presence of competitors in the case of sales, and presence of
alternative suppliers in the case of procurement
length years of transaction with partner firm
state a dummy variable for sampled firm being a state-owned firm
qstate a dummy variable for sampled firm being either a collective firm
or a firm whose majority share holder is a public holding com-
pany
spoffice a dummy variable for sampled firm having a supervisory au-
thority in local government
pvt a dummy variable for sampled firm being private-owned
tsales total sales in 10000 yuan of sampled firm in 2000
manufact a dummy variable for presence of rival to sampled firms
out a dummy variable for partner firm being located outside the city
boundary
proc procurement in 100 yuan from partner firm
tprofitA total profit to total asset ratio
cashA cash holdings to total asset ratio
liqLA liquid liabilities to total asset ratio
totA total assets in 10000 yuan
amount amount in 10000 yuan borrowed from banks
maturity maturity of bank loans in days
irate interest charged by banks
lgv* a set of dummy variables for what the firm expects from local
government when in trouble. lgvbk indicates exerting an influ-
ence on banks’ loan decisions, lgvdspt indicates intervention to
disputes, lgvsbsdy indicates subsidy, lgvprsnel indicates send-
ing firms personnel, lgvinfo indicates sharing information.
afters,c an overall use in percentage of late payments by a sampled firm
bkchks,c an overall use in percentage of bank checks for payments by a
sampled firm
bkplastics,c an overall use in percentage of credit cards for payments by a
sampled firm
It is not always true that a trading partner who has a large share in firm’s transactions exerts more
bargaining power, because it is relative market power between firm and its partner that determines24
distribution of bargaining powers*6. Although one cannot claim that picking only the largest trading
partners necessarily biases estimates, one should address a concern that effects of bargaining power
of trading partners may be overestimated as we collect information of the largest trading partners in
each categories. Ideally, trading partners should be sampled from a pool of potential partners, by
noting that actual trading partners are chosen from this pool. However, there does not exist an official
list of firms for each products nor it is practically possible to list all firms who has a capacity to supply
products of certain characteristics. If we resort to the second best where we randomly select trading
partners from actual trading partners, there will be a measurement error problem that firms may
not record all transactions made in small amounts. Not only survey nonresponses reduce number
of observations but nonrandomly placed nonresponses and measurement errors cancel significant
portion of benefits of randomization. These considerations led us to pick the largest trading partners
but with some caution. For cautionary measures, we have asked firms about market power in trade
with partners, years of trade, and uniqueness of products, or the market power variables, which all
are thought to affect distribution of bargaining powers, and included them in estimation.
Table A4: Descriptive Statistics of Sales Transactions
min 10% 25% median 75% 90% max mean std 0s NAs n
days 0.00 3.00 10.00 30.00 35.00 66.00 180.00 32.23 34.46 1 0 81
cod 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 60.00 90.00 100.00 32.57 36.69 33 0 81
bef 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 20.00 100.00 6.79 15.09 57 0 81
after 0.00 0.00 20.00 70.00 100.00 100.00 180.00 61.63 42.23 13 0 81
manufact 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.47 0.50 43 0 81
distretail 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.30 0.46 57 0 81
national 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.38 0.49 50 0 81
sales 1.61 3.47 4.25 5.52 6.26 7.38 9.11 5.33 1.60 0 0 81
unq 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.47 54 0 81
rival 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.36 12 0 81
length 1.00 3.00 4.00 7.00 12.00 17.00 37.00 8.61 6.81 0 0 81
state 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30 73 0 81
qstate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.28 74 0 81
spoffice 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.59 0.49 33 0 81
pvt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.22 0.42 63 0 81
tsales 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.17 0.31 0.95 0.15 0.17 0 0 81
manuf 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.74 0.44 21 0 81
tprofitA −1.24 −0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.27 0.01 0.15 0 0 81
cashA 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.14 0.54 0.06 0.08 0 0 81
liqLA 0.01 0.22 0.39 0.51 0.69 0.88 4.86 0.60 0.58 0 0 81
totA 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.16 0.30 0.64 3.64 0.29 0.48 0 0 81
lgvbk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.43 0.50 46 0 81
lgvdspt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.46 0.50 44 0 81
lgvsbsdy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.22 77 0 81
lgvprsnel 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.12 0.33 71 0 81
lgvinfo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.43 0.50 46 0 81
amount 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.13 1.00 0.07 0.14 0 19 81
irate 2.00 5.21 5.75 6.35 7.02 7.60 9.20 6.32 1.25 0 20 81
maturity 6.00 7.20 12.00 12.00 21.00 36.00 96.00 18.05 14.97 0 19 81
Note: med is an indicator for medium scale firms. Multiple answers are allowed in lgvbk, lgvdspt, lgvsbsdy, lgvprsnel, lgvinfo.
*6For example, consider number of alternative trading partners as a fall back option in bargaining models.
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Table A5: Descriptive Statistics of Procurement Transactions
min 10% 25% median 75% 90% max mean std 0s NAs n
days 0.00 1.00 7.00 20.00 30.00 31.00 90.00 21.20 17.85 1 0 70
cod 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 90.00 100.00 100.00 38.29 42.49 30 0 70
bef 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 20.00 100.00 9.44 24.36 52 0 70
after 0.00 0.00 0.00 60.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 52.14 43.57 22 0 70
manufact 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.36 0.48 45 0 70
distretail 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.30 0.46 49 0 70
national 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.31 0.47 48 0 70
proc 0.59 2.97 3.81 4.94 5.79 6.69 8.75 4.78 1.59 0 0 70
rival 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.76 0.43 17 0 70
length 0.00 3.00 5.00 7.00 11.00 16.10 53.00 9.07 8.60 1 0 70
state 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.00 0.10 0.30 63 0 70
qstate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.26 65 0 70
spoffice 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.59 0.50 29 0 70
pvt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.24 0.43 53 0 70
tsales 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.16 0.30 0.95 0.15 0.18 0 0 70
manuf 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.69 0.47 22 0 70
tprofitA −1.24 −0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.27 0.01 0.16 0 0 70
cashA 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.15 0.30 0.06 0.06 0 0 70
liqLA 0.01 0.19 0.33 0.47 0.69 0.84 2.35 0.53 0.36 0 0 70
totA 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.29 0.64 3.64 0.29 0.51 0 0 70
lgvbk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.44 0.50 39 0 70
lgvdspt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.44 0.50 39 0 70
lgvsbsdy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.17 68 0 70
lgvprsnel 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.00 0.10 0.30 63 0 70
lgvinfo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.41 0.50 41 0 70
amount 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.13 1.00 0.07 0.15 0 17 70
irate 2.40 5.30 5.79 6.54 7.20 7.78 15.00 6.60 1.67 0 18 70
maturity 6.00 6.20 12.00 12.00 24.00 36.00 96.00 18.23 15.65 0 17 70
Note: med is an indicator for medium scale firms.
Table A4 and Table A5 show descriptive statistics of trade credits in sales and procurement transac-
tions, respectively. We have classified trading partners into government-owned and nongovernment-
owned.The classification is less finer than our sampled firms because it is difficult to get detailed
information on trading partners’ exact ownership types, especially those of outside the city.
In sales transactions, we see that lending is predominant in all ownership types. This is especially
so for state-owned firms and quasistate-owned firms. These firms provide more net credits than
other ownership types through mostly postpayments to trading partners. While state-owned firms
offer more credits to buyers, they also receive more credits from sellers as well. This can be seen by
comparing when trading partner is a government-owned firm or not. Both Table A4 and Table A5
suggest sampled firms tend to offer more net credits to government-owned firms.
In procurement, borrowing is predominant. In particular, state-owned firms do not use prepay-
ments at all. They at the same time receive more net credits than any other ownership types.
Peculiarity of government-owned firms is also confirmed in procurement transactions that other
ownership types offer more gross credits through prepayment to government-owned firms than to
private-owned firms, while use more or less the same proportions of postpayments to government-
and non-government- owned firms.
B Descriptive Statistics on Differences in Borrowing and Lending
The importance of trade credits can be seen from the financial data of the firms. In the year
2000, accounts receivable and other supplier credits account for about 16% of their total assets at
the median, which is more than twenty times of median fixed investments. Mean value is similar,
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Table B1: Trade Credits of the Firms as Ratios of Total Assets in 2000 and 2001
min 25% median 75% max mean st dev 0s NAs n
2000
accounts receivable 0.000 0.005 0.032 0.056 0.329 0.054 0.083 1 97 112
other supplier credits 0.005 0.052 0.133 0.190 1.162 0.147 0.154 0 17 112
liquid assets 0.024 0.265 0.435 0.609 4.211 0.483 0.442 0 11 112
long-term investments 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.033 0.559 0.050 0.115 0 67 112
accounts payable 0.000 0.019 0.035 0.088 0.962 0.103 0.209 2 91 112
other customer credits 0.001 0.047 0.089 0.190 1.190 0.163 0.198 0 22 112
liquid liabilities 0.011 0.391 0.487 0.676 4.859 0.580 0.539 0 15 112
2001
accounts receivable 0.000 0.002 0.009 0.053 0.182 0.038 0.058 3 94 112
other supplier credits 0.000 0.041 0.102 0.193 0.713 0.144 0.133 0 7 112
liquid assets 0.005 0.276 0.420 0.581 8.202 0.500 0.780 0 5 112
long-term investments 0.000 0.001 0.009 0.051 0.924 0.070 0.161 2 61 112
accounts payable 0.000 0.021 0.043 0.107 0.914 0.101 0.189 2 89 112
other customer credits 0.001 0.031 0.088 0.195 0.887 0.143 0.159 0 18 112
liquid liabilities 0.001 0.317 0.484 0.635 1.623 0.489 0.261 0 8 112
Note:
and the similar figures can be found in 2001. Accounts payable and other customer credits are about
11% of total assets at median, which is smaller than the mean of 26%. This shows that some firms
use the customer credits more extensively than they use the supplier credits.
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